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Twelve years ago a dozen undergraduate science students,
most of them from Stanford University and the University of
California at Davis, obtained some modest federal funding to
undertake a study of environmental problems at California's Mono
Lake. 1 That lake, an ancient and very salty body of water lying
directly east of Yosemite National Park, had then received
relatively little scientific (or political or legal) attention,
compared to its more famous and far younger neighbor to the
north, Lake Tahoe. 2 But in the several decades preceding 1976,
Mono Lake had been severely impacted by water development
projects undertaken by the City of Los Angeles. Those projects
by the early 1970's were diverting about 100,000 acre-feet of
fresh water a year from several of the streams which flow into
the lake and were sending that water south to the Owens Valley
and the two hundred thirty-three mile Los Angeles Aqueduct to the
city. 3 This had led to a dramatic lowering in the water level of
Mono Lake.4
The students set out to study the environmental consequences
of Los Angeles' water projects in the Mono Basin. But, alarmed
by what they found, they did not simply report back to the
sponsoring agency, publish a scientific paper and move on to
other work. Instead, some of them decided to organize
politically in order to try to save Mono Lake. Among their
concerns were the possibility of severe damage to the lake's food
supply for local and migratory bird populations, 5 as well as the
prospect of substantial disruption of nesting patterns.5
The result of these initial student research and
organizational efforts was the formation of the Mono Lake
Committee / 7 which in turn set in motion a fascinating series of
events. The story is not yet complete, but one clear consequence
of the students' initiative has been an important evolution
regarding the ancient legal doctrine on "public trust." This is
undoubtedly of major importance to California water rights law
today and may, like the development of the prior appropriation
doctrine in the mid-nineteenth century courts in California,8
ultimately be important to water rights law in all the western
states, if not the entire nation. Whether this doctrinal
evolution will lead to the "saving" of Mono Lake or comparable
lakes and streams, as preservationists would understand that
term, is however an entirely different matter. As to that, the
consequences of the students' effort are far from certain.
In this paper I shall deal first with the doctrinal
evolution represented by the Mono Lake decision handed down by a
unanimous Supreme Court of California in 1983. I then will
discuss post-1983 developments relevant to the integration of the
public trust doctrine and water rights law in California; three
possible scenarios regarding future developments of the public
trust doctrine as a tool for the preservation of instream flow;
and my perspectives on legal aspects of the future of free-
flowing waters in the western landscape.
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Doctrinal Evolution: From Tidelands Controversies to Mono Basin
Water Diversions
Long before 1983 the courts in California had made it plain
that the public trust doctrine has a significant function with
regard to land associated with navigable water. The concept was
employed as early as the 1850's with regard to land around the
edge of San Francisco Bay, 9 and the courts at that time drew on
an ancient tradition with regard to navigable bays and rivers.19
The core idea was that because of the public's interest in
navigation, commerce and fishing, private titles to tidelands and
submerged lands would be held subject to a "public trust," often
articulated as a public trust easement. 11 Notably, the
legitimacy of private ownership and development of these special
lands was thus usually accepted. 12 Perhaps that was inevitable,
given the intense development pressure on much of California's
coastal land during the nineteenth century. Furthermore, it was
accepted that the public easement over small areas could be
terminated in order to advance trust values in a large area."
But, in principle at least, 14 where those criteria for
termination were not satisfied, the public right could not be
extinguished. 19 Apparently in California such extinction cannot
occur even by way of explicit legislative mandate, 16 so the
doctrine takes on the dimensions of an implied constitutional
limitation upon legislative power.17
During this century the California courts have been
expansive in their elaboration of the public trust interest in
lands associated with navigable water. Private persons have been
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allowed standing to sue on the basis of the public trust
doctrine, 18 and in dicta the courts have repeatedly stated that
public trust interests encompass far more than the classical
trilogy of navigation, commerce and fishing. 19 of particular
interest to those who support instream flow protection is
judicial mention regarding tidelands of the preservation of
public uses such as scientific study, open space and wildlife
habitat. 28 Finally, recently the California Supreme Court laid
to rest any suggestion that the public trust doctrine is limited
to tideland or coastal areas. The key is not that land is on the
coast, but that it is associated with navigable water. Thus,
private titles to lands around the edge of inland navigable lakes
such as Lake Tahoe and Clear Lake have been held to be burdened
by the public trust easement.21
Typically the development proposal which would trigger a
lawsuit invoking the public trust doctrine in California would
involve something like a marina along the edge of a bay or
buildings to be constructed on fill in a bay. 22 Prior to 1983
land development rather than water development was generally the
concern, 23 although occasionally courts intimated that the public
trust doctrine might have to do with protection of public
interests in navigable water as well as those in land associated
with navigable water. 24 Since the public uses in the classic
trilogy--navigation, commerce and fishing--involve the use of
water directly, and the use of associated land only indirectly,
it required no great leap of imagination to suggest interference
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with navigable water alone might trigger public trust review. To
dry up a lake through diversion of the streams which feed it
obviously destroys navigation and other water-dependent uses just
as definitively as fill could ever do.
In 1977, when at the request of the Mono Lake Committee
lawyers for national environmental protection organizations began
to examine legal theories which might be used to protect inflows
to the lake, the public trust doctrine quickly became a prime
candidate. Inspired by an influential law review article which
touted the doctrine as a tool by which preservationists could
achieve effective judicial intervention in disputes over the
allocation of natural resources, 25 researchers quickly seized on
the idea of basing a legal challenge to the operations of the
City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power on the public
trust doctrine." About that same time a staff paper prepared
for a blue-ribbon commission engaged in a review of California
water law noted the logic of applying the public trust doctrine
to protect instream flows, 27 and favorable commentary appeared
elsewhere." The momentum for a challenge was building, and suit
was filed in 1979. 29 By 1983, after a series of procedural
matters had been resolved," the matter was before the Supreme
Court of California for a decision on whether the plaintiffs
could properly base their action upon the public trust
doctrine. 31
The Mono Lake opinion which emerged is an elegant and
forceful analysis authored by Justice Allen Broussard. It is
unanimous on the fundamental question of the relevance of the
public trust doctrine to damage to public uses of navigable
waters caused by the exercise of appropriative rights. 32 The
environmental threat to mono Lake is noted, and the history of
both the public trust and the appropriation doctrine are reviewed
in some detail. Borrowing a phrase from an article by Professor
Ralph Johnson, 33 Justice Broussard in his opinion describes the
two doctrines as "on a collision course." 34 But he concludes the
collision can be avoided and doctrinal harmony achieved if the
California courts will simply integrate the two doctrines. 38 To
do this, Justice Broussard suggests it will be necessary to
modify somewhat the rigor with which, in his view, the public
trust doctrine has been applied to land rights. 38 But, with this
caveat, integration of the two doctrines will preserve the
viability of California's massive water development system while
minimizing environmental harm whenever feasible.37
The most serious threat to success for the plaintiffs in the
Mono Lake suit in 1983 was an argument advanced by the state
attorney general. This argument in effect acknowledged the logic
of applying public trust doctrine thinking to water diversion
situations, but provided an ingenious explanation of why that
logic has not been developed in recent decades. The explanation
is that the public trust doctrine, with its preservationist
flavor, has been superceded by a public policy keyed more to
water development than to preservation. The policy, formalized
in a constitutional amendment in 1928, 38 calls for the maximum
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reasonable beneficial use of water resources. According to this
argument, any one reasonable beneficial use of water is by nature
as acceptable constitutionally as any other--it is as if the
public trust were to include irrigation, power production and
municipal water supply as equal in stature to navigation,
commerce and fishing."
A consequence of this view advanced by the attorney general
would be to sort out uses by priority, subject to the power of
the state pursuant to the constitutional policy to make
modifications in the name of reasonableness. Instream uses would
be protected or enhanced not because a public property right is
being vindicated, but because the state has broad authority to
rearrange the rights of appropriators, for example those engaged
in diversions from the source."
Despite a series of recent judicial opinions in which state
authority has been upheld or expanded / 41 Justice Broussard in the
Mono Lake opinion resists any temptation to follow the line of
reasoning suggested by the attorney general. His opinion
acknowledges that the public trust doctrine serves to strengthen
and broaden SWRCB authority--clearly the board's predecessor
erred in 1940 in thinking that in passing on Los Angeles'
application to appropriate water in Mono Basin the detrimental
consequences for Mono Lake could not legally be taken into
account. 42 But by keeping the public trust doctrine separate
from the reasonable beneficial use doctrine, Justice Broussard is
able to conclude the trust also imposes a duty on the state to
act to some extent in a way protective of in situ public trust
uses of water.43
Although the Mono Lake opinion makes no reference to the
fact, by 1983 it was clear there was a political stalemate in
California with regard to the protection of instream uses of
water. Late in the 1950's the legislature had taken some steps
toward better instream protection, for example by providing that
fish, wildlife and recreation uses are beneficial uses of
water. 44 In 1972, on the heels of cancellation of a planned unit
in the State Water Project, 45 a California Wild and Scenic Rivers
Act was passed into law.'" But then in 1979 the court of appeal
in two different decisions held that private persons with no
plans to divert or otherwise physically control water are not
eligible to have their applications to appropriate water
considered, 47 and efforts to overturn those rulings by
legislation have been unsuccessful." Similarly, efforts to
provide for comprehensive instream flow regulations, as proposed
by a blue-ribbon commission, 49 have been turned down by the
legislature." This occurred despite extensive documentation of
the enormous damage to instream resources which has resulted from
water development projects. 51 The court in earlier decisions had
displayed an awareness of and sensitivity to the policy
objectives of the Governor's Commission, 52 and a similar attitude
on the instream protection question may have played some
unarticulated part in the Mono Lake decision.
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In conclusion, what the Mono Lake decision provided was
approval of a theory: that the ancient public trust doctrine may
in the proper circumstances serve to limit how much water may be
diverted pursuant to an appropriative right. Los Angeles was not
ordered to give up anything. Instead, it was put on notice that
the environmentalist challenge could proceed and that the many
obvious questions would have to be resolved later on. These
include factual determinations as to the extent, if any, to which
the city's diversions are causing or will cause harm to the
public trust uses of Mono Lake; the methodology for integrating
legitimate claims for protection pursuant to the public trust
doctrine with equally legitimate claims to use water pursuant to
the appropriation doctrine; whether diminution of use of water by
an appropriator can in any public trust circumstance constitute a
taking of property for which just compensation is owed; and, if
so, the appropriate taking analysis to apply.
Developments Since 1983: The Lower American River and Bay-Delta
Disputes
In the Mono Lake litigation which produced the California
Supreme Court's landmark decision, very little has been
accomplished since 1983 to further the integration of the public
trust doctrine and the prior appropriation doctrine. 53 Instead,
the litigants have been preoccupied with the question of what
forum will undertake that task. 54 The meaning and implementation
of the 1983 mandate have, however, been under active
consideration in regard to two other important water
controversies in California. These will now be described in some
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detail, for they provide useful factual contexts within which the
reader can imagine alternatives for fleshing out what meaning the
public trust doctrine will have or should have for the exercise
of water rights. The nature of what will eventually emerge is
crucial to answering the question whether the public trust
doctrine will ever be the basis for effective protection or
enhancement of instream values.
One of the non-Mono Lake California controversies involves a
proposed diversion from the lower American River. This river,
which flows through the heart of California's capital at
Sacramento, was initially untouched by the massive federal
Central Valley Project (CVP) begun in the 1930's. 55 But since
World War II Congress has authorized three CVP dams on the lower
American, as well as the Folsom South Canal to divert water from
the river just above Sacramento. 58 (See map at Appendix A.)
To date only two of the three authorized dams and about
twenty-seven miles of the canal have been constructed.
Completion of the largest of the dams, Auburn Dam, is currently
blocked by concerns over seismic safety, vehement opposition from
environmental groups and questions about cost-sharing. Without
Auburn Dam, a decision by the state providing for substantial
instreams flows in the American River as it passes through
Sacramento is not legally effective. 57 Nonetheless since 1962
the Sacramento County Board of Supervisors has invested more than
twenty million dollars in an extensive parkway along both sides
of the American River below the canal's point of diversion.58
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The amenity value of the American River Parkway would be
greatly decreased without the river's present instream flows,
themselves in part a result of the two CVP dams already in place.
One way to preserve those flows would be to complete the
construction of Auburn Dam, but as noted above that course is now
doubtful. In the absence of Auburn Dam or some substitute for
it, to preserve those flows it is necessary to prevent or
minimize future diversions of water to the Folsom South Canal.
To date the only water delivered through the canal is sold
pursuant to a contract to deliver up to 75,000 acre-feet a year
of cooling water to the Sacramento Municipal Utility District's
troubled Rancho Seco nuclear power plant. 59 A second contract,
however, entered into in 1970 by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation,
provides for delivery through the Folsom South Canal of up to
150,000 acre-feet annually to the East Bay Municipal Utility
District (EBMUD). EBMUD plans at a future date to use water
obtained pursuant to this contract to augment supplies for its
service area in the rapidly growing region to the east of San
Francisco.
The EBMUD-Bureau of Reclamation contract has been
controversial. The Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) and others
brought suit in the early 1970's against EBMUD with regard to its
contract for American River water. The plaintiffs alleged if
EBMUD took delivery of the water as contemplated by the contract,
the district would be in violation of the reasonableness
provision of the California constitution in two ways: first, it
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would be ignoring its legal obligation to engage in a program to
reclaim waste water; and second, by taking a water supply from an
upstream location rather than an available downstream location,
it would be precluding multiple beneficial use of much of the
water in the lower American River." In effect, EDF was asking
that any diversion be from below Sacramento to maximize the
amenity value of the parkway, e.c., the fishing and boating
associated with substantial instream flows.
EDF and the County of Sacramento (an intervenor) were
unsuccessful on the waste water reclamation claim, but the point
of diversion claim survived an initial ruling by the California
Supreme Court that any constraint imposed by the state
constitution was preempted by operation of the federal
Reclamation Act of 1902. 61 By the time the case had made its way
to the U.S. Supreme Court and back to the state court system,62
the 1983 Mono Lake decision was on the books. So in late 1984
when a California Superior Court appointed the State Water
Resources Control Board (SWRCB) as referee in the case, the
public trust doctrine was of major concern.
In the ensuing court reference proceeding before the SWRCB,
the question of the integration of the public trust doctrine with
conventional water rights--there, the contractual rights of EBMUD
rather than the appropriative ones of the Bureau of Reclamation--
was extensively debated. A lengthy legal report prepared by
SWRCB staff expressed many conclusions regarding the public trust
doctrine as it relates to California water law: for example,
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that the doctrine applies to contractors for the use of water;
that new projects to appropriate water may be required to release
water at rates exceeding natural flow during some seasons to
minimize harm to public trust resources; that the public trust
may be considered notwithstanding the absence of all parties
whose conduct might affect a river (e.g., the Bureau of
Reclamation, not a party to the lawsuit); and that a diverter
with the required water rights should be permitted to take water
from a river whenever there is flow surplus to that necessary to
maintain constitutionally reasonable public trust uses.63
These generally expansive understandings of the public trust
doctrine were of little practical consequence to the plaintiffs,
however, because the staff found as a matter of fact that even
under conditions of maximum diversion pursuant to the EBMUD
contract, there would be only a minor effect on the public trust
uses of the lower American River." Thus, although the public
trust doctrine was treated as applicable to the situation, the
difficult job of integration in the face of serious consequences
to instream values from water project diversions was avoided. 65
So we learn little in the end of what the public trust doctrine
means for existing water rights: it is as if, after an extensive
fact-finding process, the decision were that Los Angeles' Mono
Basin diversions are causing only minor adverse consequences for
the natural resources dependent upon Mono Lake.
A similar result seems much less likely in California's
other major current public trust water rights controversy,
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although the relevant administrative hearing is only at an early
stage. This controversy involves the protection and enhancement
of water quality in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta, where a
serious threat to water quality comes from salinity intrusion.
(See map at Appendix B.)
Before the time of major water projects on the rivers of
California's Central Valley, salinity often intruded beyond San
Francisco Bay upward through the Delta. Sometimes it went as
high as the City of Sacramento, normally late in the summer
months when the runoff from the Sierra snowpack was over and the
fall rains had not yet begun. By way of contrast, enormous
unregulated flows in the winter and spring would often push the
saline water back toward San Francisco Bay and the Pacific
Ocean."
One consequence of the many projects on rivers which flow
toward San Francisco Bay has been to even out the instream flows.
Flood control takes the peaks off the winter flows, and use of
the river channels to deliver stored water augments the summer
flows. As has happened with the lower American River, advantage
has been taken of this new situation. In particular, there has
been intensive development of the Delta for several important
purposes: agriculture on the Delta's many islands; industry at
several locations; and the export of water, both for agricultural
use in the San Joaquin Valley and for municipal and industrial
water supply in the Bay Area and in Southern California. In
addition, many people have relied on the continued existence of
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the fish and wildlife which live permanently in or pass through
the Delta.
Many of these activities require, however, that nature not
be permitted again to push saline waters up through the Delta.
Much consideration at one time was given to proposals to
construct a physical barrier somewhere in the estuary, 67 but
instead the state has relied on a hydraulic barrier to do the
job. The mechanism has been to place conditions on the permits
to appropriate water of the two largest diverters from the Delta:
the cvP and the State Water Project (SW?), which parallels the
CVP in many respects. Most of the permits issued to the
operators of those two projects since the late 1950's have
contained conditions pertaining to water quality and to
coordination of terms and conditions among the many CV? and SW?
permits. The conditions contemplate that salinity control will
be obtained either by a reduction or cessation of exports from
the Delta or by releases from natural flow or water in storage at
upstream facilities maintained by both projects.
In view of the complexity of the interaction of Delta
inflow, Delta consumptive uses, export diversions, agricultural
return flows and tidal action, the state has taken the position
that salinity control conditions for the Delta should not be of
unlimited duration. Instead, conditions are fixed on an interim
basis, and jurisdiction is reserved to reexamine the situation
and consider revised conditions as some point in the future.
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The last decision made by the SWRCB in furtherance of this
reserved jurisdiction was Decision 1485 (D1485) in 1978. 68 D1485
contemplated that the board would reopen its hearing on Delta
salinity control by 1986, 69 in order to re-examine its standards
in light of additional information gathered in the interim. The
hearing was in fact reopened in the summer of 1987, and it has
under consideration not only water quality problems in the Delta
but also those in San Francisco Bay. The hearing is scheduled to
continue periodically until a decision is issued in 1990. Phase
I of the hearing has just been completed. It was designed to
identify the beneficial uses of the waters of the San Francisco
Bay-Delta estuary, to determine the water quality objectives that
will maintain such uses and to gather recommendations on how the
SWRCB should achieve these objectives.
The relevance and meaning of the public trust doctrine have
been important subjects of consideration in Phase I of the Bay-
Delta hearings. Enormous amounts of evidence have been
introduced on the impact (or non-impact) of water projects and
pollution on public trust uses of Bay-Delta waters. 78 Similarly,
attention has been devoted to the benefit of exports of water
from the Delta, thus laying the basis for any weighing of public
trust damage and export benefit which may become necessary. And
in submitting closing briefs many of the parties have set forth
their understanding of what the public trust doctrine requires of
the board.
16
Three Scenarios for the Future
In thinking about what difference the public trust doctrine
might make with regards to water resource controversies such as
those involving Mono Lake, the lower American River and the Bay-
Delta, it may be useful to consider three possible scenarios for
future development. Doubtless more than three can be suggested,
and doubtless the future reality will not conform precisely to
any of these three or other possible models. But consideration
of these three possibilities may help to clarify the issues.
Scenario One. Scenario One might be called the
"interpretation" scenario, in that the public trust doctrine here
functions mainly as an aid in the interpretation or construction
or fortification of other norms.
In this scenario the public trust doctrine is an evocative
name for an elusive creature of the law--a sense that for certain
special natural resources such as navigable water, great care
must be taken. Of course, to what end care must be taken is
never entirely clear. It may be the end is established by some
sense of the direction in which public policy is moving in the
period when the job of interpretation arises.
Professor Charles Wilkinson's study of the public trust
doctrine in public land law is suggestive. 71 When the dominant
public policy favored disposition of federal lands to states and
settlers, the public trust doctrine supported the federal
government's fiduciary obligation to hold land for future
disposition. 72 When the federal government began to be a more
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aggressive manager of its land, the doctrine supported extensive
federal authority. 73 And when it was understood that the
greatest threat to preservation of certain public values on
federal lands might be the federal government itself, the public
trust was used as a foundation for imposing obligations on the
government.74
Another example of a trust notion, the significance of which
has changed over time as public policy has shifted, is provided
by the federal law dealing with tribes of Native Americans.
Initially, the trust served as the basis for a federalist judge
to resist the exercise of state power over tribes viewed as
dependent upon the federal government. 75 Later, at the threshold
of a period of intense pressure to assimilate Indians into the
dominant society, the trust arising from the dependent status of
tribes served to justify very extensive--even "plenary"-- federal
power over tribes, even where no explicit constitutional basis
could be found for the exercise of that power. 76 Finally, in
recent years, when public policy has been more protective of
tribal self-government, the trust has served as a basis for
obligations imposed on the federal government vis-a-vis a
tribe.77
With regard to water rights, the interpretation scenario
would call for the public trust doctrine to be used to buttress
the dominant contemporary public policies regarding water. One
such policy that can be easily identified is the policy in favor
of the protection and enhancement of water quality. This policy
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has been important since the modern environmental protection
movement gained the public's attention in the late 1960's and
early 1970's, but it seems even more important now that there is
great focus on toxics in drinking water supplies.
Interestingly, in the most important public trust judicial
decision in California since the 1983 Mono Lake ruling, the Court
of Appeal drew on the public trust doctrine in the D1485 case
mainly in order to support the authority of the SWRCB to enforce
water quality standards for nonconsumptive, instream uses.78
This point was made as one basis for refuting the contention of
the Bureau of Reclamation that once a permit to appropriate has
been issued, the SWRCB has no authority to modify it. The Court
of Appeal there was able to draw on Justice Broussard's
observation in the Mono Lake decision that appropriators of water
have no "vested" right to divert in a manner harmful to the
interests protected by the public trust."
Significantly, independently of the public trust doctrine,
it is clear appropriators of water in California have no vested
right to use water unreasonably. 80 Indeed, the Court of Appeal
itself noted that the SWRCB is "authorized to modify . . . permit
terms under its power to prevent waste or unreasonable use or
methods of diversion of water." 81 Furthermore, water quality
standards could be enforced against permittees on the basis of
statutory authority to reserve jurisdiction to impose new
standards on projects in the name of the public interest.82
Thus, both with regard to the enforcement of water quality
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standards and the vestedness of water rights, the public trust
doctrine served only to fortify an idea already found in the law.
Scenario Two. Scenario Two could be called the
"consideration" scenario. Here the emphasis is upon the
obligation of a resource allocator to consider all aspects,
particularly all environmental aspects, of a resource allocation
decision. In the Mono Lake situation, the SWRCB's predecessor
board, when it issued the appropriation permits to Los Angeles in
1940, indicated under its view of the law it could not take into
account the detrimental impact the diversions might have on the
aesthetic and recreational value of the Mono Basin. 83 Clearly
that view of what to consider in the exercise of resource
allocation authority was wrong, as we now know from Justice
Broussard's opinion.
As with the interpretation scenario, it is not clear how
much the consideration scenario really adds to contemporary
resource allocation decision-making. For decisions on new
appropriations of water, in California at least there already are
extensive consideration requirements in CEQA, the California
Environmental Quality Act. 84 This statute, modeled upon the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)," mandates
documentation as well as consideration in many situations. CEQA
does not reach back to decisions made before 1970, 86 but as noted
above earlier allocation decisions--at least those made after
1928--are subject to reexamination pursuant to the state
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constitutional reasonableness requirement. And contemporary
reexamination would come under CEQA.
The "consideration" scenario seems very consistent with the
practice of the SWRCB since 1983. There has been no revolution
in decision-making, or even any noticeable change except with
regard to nomenclature. There are now "public trust" findings
made in addition to or in lieu of other findings, but there is
nothing to indicate any change in the content of decisions.
Relatively little time has elapsed, of course, since 1983, and
the SWRCB in the lower American River case or the Bay-Delta case
or a possible future Mono Lake case might in fact move more
boldly in response to the mandate to integrate the public trust
and appropriative rights doctrines. But so far there are no
discernible signs of such a bold response.
One result of the comparison of the public trust doctrine
with CEQA (or NEPA) is to suggest that any change brought by
Justice Broussard's opinion will be purely procedural. To the
dismay of many environmentalists, NEPA and CEQA have turned out
to be powerful procedural tools but entirely ineffective in
laying down normative guidelines for the substance of agency
action. 87 This is true even though the policy sections of those
two statutes are rather detailed and generally preservationist in
tone. 88 The public trust doctrine, although somewhat
preservationist in its tidelands origins, lacks even the amount
of substantive detail found in NEPA and CEQA.
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Scenario Three. Scenario Three is a "property right"
scenario. This scenario takes the "public trust" as literally
analogous to a private trust, where, in addition to a trustee,
there are beneficiaries and the latter are considered to be the
equitable owners of the trust assets. For this understanding,
with the public trust the state is the trustee of navigable
waters and associated lands. Members of the public within the
state are the beneficiaries and are therefore equitable owners of
the waters and lands in question.
This understanding draws support both from the closely
related Equal Footing doctrine of the federal law" - clearly a
"property right" doctrine in its application to land under
navigable or tidal water - and from statutory statements to the
effect that all water within the state is "the property of the
people of the state,"" although use rights may be acquired
according to the law. It also draws on the implication in
judicial pronouncements on the public trust doctrine that the
legislature is constrained in its freedom to act by the people's
property right--that, for example, in the words of Justice
Broussard, the people's "common heritage of streams, lakes,
marshlands and tidelands" may be surrendered by the state only
"in rare cases when the abandonment of that right is consistent
with the purposes of the trust."91
The most useful analogy for the property right scenario is
the development of the "reserved" right of federal water rights
law. Federal courts responded to the prospect of Indian tribes
22
settled on lands with inadequate water supplies by developing the
notion that when congress (or the executive exercising properly
delegated authority) reserved public lands for tribes, it also
impliedly reserved an adequate water supply. 92 The same idea was
subsequently applied to other federal land reservations, such as
national recreation areas, wildlife refugees, forests and
parks. 93 Similarly, in a public trust property right scenario
the emphasis would be upon judicial fashioning of a public right
to deal with inadequate legislative provision of protection for
instream values important to the public.
In the case of federal law reserved water rights, fifty-five
years elapsed between the time the U.S. Supreme Court clearly
established the right for the benefit of Indian tribes (1908) and
the time the content of the right was laid down (1963). 94 Even
now, it appears the standard as to content--"practically
irrigable acreage"--may be limited to situations where the
Indians are engaged in irrigation, as opposed, for example, to
those where they need water to support a fishery. So it may
similarly be that a period of time will be needed in state law to
let the legitimacy of the public trust limitation on water rights
become established, before courts begin the task of establishing
the precise boundaries of the public's water right. For the time
being it may be enough simply to say the public right requires
enough water in a stream or in a lake to protect indefinitely -
"whenever feasible" - the viability of the major public trust
uses of the source.
23
Of the three scenarios under discussion, it is the property
right scenario which has the greatest potential for impact in
situations like the Mono Lake case where established (if not for
these purposes "vested") water rights exist. Similarly, it is
the property right scenario which is most likely to produce
claims an unconstitutional taking has occurred. Los Angeles
itself, as a creature of the state which is engaged in the
putative taking, may encounter difficulty in presenting a taking
argument. 95 But, in other situations, for example those where
privately held rights are effectively limited because a public
trust claim is held to have created a superior property right, it
may be necessary to deal with the taking point. And this will
occur in a context in which the U.S. Supreme Court, already
arguably hostile to the public trust doctrine as understood by
the California courts," may have hardened its position on when a
taking exists. 97 Nonetheless, the law with regard to "judicial"
takings of this sort is far from settled, 98 making any prediction
hazardous. And even if application of the public trust is held
to have worked a taking, in California the damages to be awarded
to appropriators which hold their water rights under a permit or
license are limited to the "actual amount paid to the State."99
Free-Flowing Water and the Law in the West 
For its first hundred years water law throughout the western
states clearly was dominated by the claims of diverters.180
Protection was provided almost exclusively for actions associated
with diversion--the capture of water and, except in the case of
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the production of electricity, the movement of that water to some
place away from the source. The claims were numerous: for
mining, agriculture, municipal water supply and other beneficial
uses essential to the settlement and development of the arid
West.
Occasionally, there were situations in those first hundred
years when courts seemed to protect the natural integrity of
rivers, but on closer examination those cases seem ultimately
more concerned with out-of-the-stream considerations than with
instream values. It is well-known, for example, that in 1884
courts in California used nuisance theory virtually to put an end
to the practice of hydraulic mining. 101 The unfortunate
consequence for rivers of that sort of mining was the creation of
enormous amounts of mining debris, much of which ended up in
rivers and the estuary downstream. But the heart of the nuisance
actions was not that the water was degraded by the mining debris,
but that the build-up of debris in the beds of rivers reduced the
carrying capacity of the channels and led to increased flooding
of and deposit of debris on farmland and towns near the river.102
Protection of land away from the stream from damage by water, not
protection of the integrity of a natural watercourse or
protection of established or anticipated instream uses, was
central to the decisions.
Similarly, in 1926 when the California Supreme Court
vindicated Mrs. Herminghaus's famous riparian claim vis-a-vis the
Southern California Edison project planned upstream, 103 it
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protected her right as a riparian to seasonal flood waters
because she wanted them as an inexpensive means for irrigation of
her grazing land. 104 There was no sense that any instream value
of the sort we discuss today was being protected.
During that first hundred years, the appropriation doctrine
became the dominant legal vehicle for the satisfaction of
diverters' claims. It was never the exclusive doctrine in the
West. It had much less importance for groundwater than for
surface water, and even for surface water some states recognized
rights to divert water based on riparian, 105 pueblo,
prescriptive status. 107 But clearly, to understand the heart of
western surface water law from the 1850's to the 1950's, one has
to understand the doctrine of prior appropriation.
For California, I think the 1950's is the appropriate decade
to select for the beginnings of a change in attitude--for initial
recognition that, alongside the diversion of water, there are
important values represented by nondiversion or the "free" flow
of water. Initially, this change was signaled by an amendment to
the Water Code to the effect that certain instream uses of water
are "beneficial" uses. 108 Thus, the concept in appropriation
theory that the origin, measure and termination of an
appropriative water right depend on beneficial use was adapted to
the instream situation. The consequence was not that water could
be appropriated for instream beneficial use, 109 but that
appropriations for diversion could be limited by permit
106 or
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conditions imposed in the name of the protection of an instream
p"	 beneficial use.110
Since the 1950's other devices have emerged in the law for
protection of instream values. The most dramatic and
11comprehensive is a wild or scenic river designation, 1 for it
can preclude almost all development on the designated stretch of
river. But others clearly exist: federal reserved rights,112
instream flow appropriation, 113 water marketing,114 flow
preservation regulations, 115 and riparian rights are among the
most interesting. 116 And condemnation deserves more attention
than it has received.117
Among all these approaches to instream flow preservation we
have the public trust doctrine. What are its comparative
advantages, and will it spread throughout the West as prior
appropriation once did?
I believe the comparative advantages of the public trust
doctrine as a tool for instream flow protection are principally
its ability to help undo past mistakes in an historically
legitimate fashion and the fact the doctrine is a creature of
state law. Each of these points requires elaboration.
Many of the legal devices for instream flow protection are
effective only with regard to diversion rights established in the
future. An instream appropriation, for example is junior to all
previously established appropriations. A wild and scenic rivers
act normally is provided only for presently undeveloped stretches
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of river. Conditions placed on an appropriation permit affect
only that appropriation, not all which have gone before.
A public trust right, by way of contrast, to the extent it
is understood as a public property right, can be viewed as in
existence from time immemorial. In Justice Broussard's words,
the right is part of the "common heritage" of the people, 118 like
the air we breathe or the sky we enjoy. It predates any
appropriative right, although in defining the scope of each kind
of right accommodation in the name of fairness may be
necessary. 119 The public trust right is thus available as a tool
to correct mistakes of the past, to the extent that can be done
without running afoul of a constitutional restriction.
The public trust doctrine is of course not the only means
for dealing with the present consequences to past mistakes.
Police power regulation can do the same thing, subject again to
constitutional restraints. But police power regulation lacks the
ancient historical roots of the public trust doctrine, which
provide a legitimacy for an unusual legal regime for very special
natural resources--a regime less accommodating of private
interests in resources than is true in other areas. Furthermore,
normally police power regulation is stated in general terms to
apply across a range of situations. The public trust doctrine
can be similarly stated, for example as a foundation for public
access to dry sand areas of a state's beaches. 120 But it also
can be tailored to the physical facts and political realities of
individual situations. Thus, it may in the end operate
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differently depending upon whether the situation is that of Mono
Lake, the lower American River or the Bay-Delta. This may be a
great advantage for a legal doctrine which, despite its ancient
origins, is largely a new one in the instream flow protection
arena.
A second comparative advantage of the public trust doctrine
is its association with state law. 121 By way of contrast, the
reserved right--which to some extent also allows the correction
of past mistakes
with regard to water rights law in the West, federal law plays a
secondary role. This has led the U.S. Supreme Court in recent
years to emphasize that the paramount federal policy on western
water rights is deference to state law and that consequently the
scope of the federal law reserved right will be narrowly
understood. 124 The public trust doctrine, as a creature of state
law, need not be interpreted in the same restrictive manner.
Since 1983 there have been indications that the courts in
some states other than California also find the public trust
doctrine an attractive tool for the resolution of water resources
controversies. The best example is Idaho, where shortly after
the 1983 Mono Lake decision the supreme court emphasized in dicta
that the public trust doctrine would be integrated with the
appropriative rights doctrine in Idaho. 125 Then in 1985 the
Idaho Supreme Court, in the context of a controversy over
appropriative water rights, noted that statutory public interest
requirements must be understood in the larger context of the
122 --is a creature of the federal law. 123 And,
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public trust doctrine. 126 This would require a public interest
analysis not only upon filing of an application for a new water
right permit, but also upon evidence of significant damage to
public trust values from exercise of a water right created long
ago 127
Montana also has employed the public trust doctrine in ways
of interest to those interested in instream flow protection. In
two decisions handed down in 1984, the Montana Supreme Court
relied on the doctrine to protect public access to and use of
streams for recreational purposes, 128 and recently it affirmed
the constitutionality of most of a statute which codified that
decision. 129 In one of the 1984 decisions, however, the court
indicated that public use rights are subordinate to an
established appropriative right. 130 Whether this point of view,
clearly one inconsistent with the California and Idaho decisions,
will be followed in case of an actual conflict between public use
and a private appropriative right remains to be seen.131
Conclusion
Today we are witnesses at many places throughout the West of
a broad change in thinking about the utilization of water
resources. Few question the need in an arid region to use some
of the limited supplies of surface waters for irrigation,
municipal water supply and other beneficial uses which require
diversions. But many believe that our institutions and legal
standards geared to water development have in some instances
gotten out of control and that as a consequence we need to do two
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things. First, we must follow a more balanced approach in future
water development projects--an approach far more sensitive to the
environmental amenities threatened by these projects. second, we
must begin to think much more seriously about correcting at least
some of the many situations where serious mistakes have been made
in the past. For those of this point of view, environmental
restoration is as important as more sensitive decision-making on
future projects.
The public trust doctrine has its greatest potential as a
tool for an aggressive approach to environmental restoration.
There is great legitimacy to the claim of a public property right
in navigable water. That right is expressed as the public trust
doctrine, and it should become a viable basis for the restoration
of instream flows or, in the case of Mono Lake, the restoration
of needed water levels. Public trust proponents will do much
less than is possible if they settle for an "interpretation" or
"consideration" public trust scenario, when so much more is
achievable in a "property right" scenario. In a time when a
conservative official such as Secretary of the Interior Donald
Hodel can seriously suggest study of the restoration of Hetch
Hetchy Valley by the destruction of a major dam, 132 proposals to
restore Mono Lake by augmenting inflows seem modest indeed. As
in any reallocation of water rights, the legitimate needs of
those like Los Angeles which have been relying on water projects
cannot be ignored. 133 But the central task is to replace the
status quo with a more balanced solution. For this, at Mono Lake
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and perhaps at other locations throughout the West, the public
trust doctrine can be an appropriate vehicle.
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1. The study was funded by the Student Originated Studies
Program of the National Science Foundation. D. Winkler (ed.), An
Ecological Study of Mono Lake, California 145 (1977) (Institute
of Ecology Publication, No. 12; University of California, Davis).
The Mono Basin Research Group consisted of five Stanford
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Earlham College and UC Santa Cruz, id. at 143, who undertook a
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D. Gaines, "Foreward: A Note on the History of Mono Lake," in
Winkler, supra, at i.
2. Whereas Mono Lake is "one of the oldest lakes in North
America," Mono Basin Ecosystem Study Committee, The Mono Basin
Ecosystem: Effects of Changing Lake Level 18 (1987) (National
Research Council; hereinafter "NRC Committee"), Lake Tahoe is
"still described as oligotrophic, free from excess nourishment,
rich in oxygen, or more generally, youthful." Ayer, "Water
Quality Control at Lake Tahoe: Dissertation on Grasshopper
Soup," 1 Ecology L.O. 3, 4 (1971). Much of the study of Lake
Tahoe has been organized and undertaken by Dr. Charles Goldman of
UC Davis.
3. California Department of Water Resources, Report of
Interagency Task Force on Mono Lake 11-13 (1979) (hereinafter,
"DWR Task Force").
4. In recent times the historic high for the lake's water
level was 6,428 feet above sea level on July 18, 1919. NRC
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its diversions, the level was about 6,417. Id. On December 17,
1981, the lake's water level reached an historic low of 6,372.
lg. several very wet years since then have caused some recovery,
to 6,380 feet in August 1986. Id. at 16. An interagency task
force recommended the lake level be stabilized at 6,388 feet,
which on the basis of 1979 estimates would have required
diversions by Los Angeles to be reduced about 85%. DWR Task
Force, supra note 3, at 55.
5. The principal foods are brine shrimp and brine flies,
and the students concluded that "although the possibility exists
that the brine shrimp and fly larvae of Mono Lake may be able to
adapt themselves physiologically to a slowly increasing salinity
or to evolve a genetic tolerance enabling survival, the weight of
evidence examined here indicates that the present populations of
these animals will not be able to withstand the increasing
salinity predicted for Mono Lake." Winkler, supra note 1, at 69.
And they noted that if the food organisms disappear from the
lake, "the bird populations which depend on them are almost sure
to follow." Id. at 3. The increasing salinity is caused by a
declining lake level, NRC Committee, supra note 2, at 44-48,
which in turn is caused mainly by exports of water from the
basin. This general view of the relationships between water
export, lake elevation, salinity level, food organism survival
and bird populations seems to be shared by the authors of a
recent report published by the National Research Council. Id. at
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2-6.
6. Winkler, supra note 1, at 3. Increased air pollution in
the form of dust storms fed by material from the newly exposed
alkaline mud flats around the lake's shoreline was also a
concern. Id.
7. The Executive Director of the Mono Lake Committee
asserted recently that "[i]f there had been no Mono Lake Research
Group, I doubt there ever would have been a campaign to save the
lake." Letter from Martha Davis to the author (February 19,
1988). Tragically, David Gaines--author of the forward to the
research group's report and a major figure in the work of the
Mono Lake Committee--was killed in an automobile accident in
January of this year. Sacramento Bee, January 13, 1988, at A3.
8. Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140 (1855). See generally R.
Dunbar, Forging New Rights in Western Waters (1983).
9. Eldridge v. Cowell, 4 Cal. 80, 85 (1854).
10. Stevens, "The Public Trust: A Sovereign's Ancient
Prerogative Becomes the People's Environmental Right," 14 U.C.
Davis L. Rev. 195 (1980).
11. See generally Dunning, "The Significance of
California's Public Trust Easement for California Water Rights
Law," 14 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 357 (1980).
12. Id. at 368-374.
13. See id. at 370. A leading federal decision, in the
application of Illinois law, made the same point somewhat more
loosely in stating that legislatures could validly grant private
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commerce on those waters, e.g. wharves, or where occupation of
the parcels does not "substantially impair the public interest in
the lands and waters remaining . . . ." Illinois central
Railroad v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892).
14. In recently summarizing the California law regarding
the duties and powers of the state as trustee, the California
Supreme Court noted that the state may surrender public trust
protection "only in rare cases when the abandonment of that right
is consistent with the purposes of the trust." National Audubon
Society v. Superior Court, 33 Ca1.3d 419, 441, 658 P.2d 709, 189
Cal. Rptr. 346, 361 (hereinafter "Audubon"), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 977 (1983) (Emphasis added.) Unfortunately, there is no
empirical study of land development in coastal areas of
California which would allow one to judge the extent to which
this principle has been reflected in practice. Elsewhere
developers have contended that the public trust doctrine by
obstructing clear title "makes it difficult to obtain mortgage
financing or to ensure the alienability of urban property at its
true value." Carlson, "The Public Trust Doctrine and Urban
Waterfront Development in Massachusetts: What is a Public
Purpose?", 7 Marv. Env. L. Rev. 71, 71 (1983). Lack of knowledge
as to the practical consequences of the public trust doctrine for
coastal land utilization and development make prediction about
the consequences of the doctrine for water resources development
particularly hazardous.
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15. To sustain the public trust easement in the face of a
legislative act of termination, one opinion suggested one must
produce "evidence indicating that the abandonment of the public
trust will impair the power of succeeding legislatures to
protect, improve, and develop the public interest in commerce,
navigation, and fisheries." Mallon v. City of Long Beach, 44
Ca1.2d 199, 207, 282 P.2d 481, 486 (1955).
16. See supra, note 14. Although these dicta are
fascinating, I have not found any example in the recently
reported California decisions of a judicially invalidated
conveyance or a development judicially prohibited on public trust
grounds following explicit legislative approval. The best
example from another state is People ex rel. Scott v. Chicago
Park District, 66 Ill. 2d 65, 360 N.E.2d 773 (1976). There the
Illinois legislature conveyed land beneath Lake Michigan to U.S.
Steel for construction of a new factory. The legislation
included a finding that the grant was made in aid of commerce and
would create no impairment of the public interest in the
remaining lands and waters. Id. at 80, 360 N.E.2d at 781. The
court termed the public benefit "too indirect, intangible and
elusive" to satisfy the criteria for termination; found private
benefit to be the "direct and dominating" purpose of the grant;
and invalidated it. Id. at 80-81, 360 N.E.2d at 781.
Presumably, the result would be the same if, instead of
attempting to place the situation within the ambit of the
established public trust termination criteria, the Illinois
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constitutional aspect of the state law public trust doctrine with
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title to land under navigable water in territories in trust for
future states and that upon admission to the Union a beneficiary
state automatically takes title to such land. Pollard v. Hagan,
44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845). Although a state's beneficial
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Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620 (1970); cf. Utah Div. of State
Lands v. U.S., 107 S. Ct. 2318 (1987), where such do not exist
the federal government must acknowledge state ownership of the
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20. Id. at 259-60, 491 P.2d at 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
Water quality control will perhaps soon be added to the list.
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38
Doctrine," in D. Getches (ed.), Water and the American West: 
Essays in Honor of Raphael J. Moses (1987).
21. State of California v. Superior Court (Fogerty), 29
Ca1.3d 240, 172 Cal. Rptr. 713, 625 P.2d 256, cert. denied, 454
U.S. 865 (1981) (Lake Tahoe); State of California v. Superior
Court (Lyon), 29 Ca1.3d 210, 172 Cal. Rptr. 696, 625 P.2d 239,
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 865 (1981) (Clear Lake). Such land lies
between the high and low water marks of these lakes. In the
aftermath of Nollen v. California Coastal Commission, 107 S. Ct.
3141 (1987) (beach access condition in a permit struck down as
not substantially furthering governmental purposes that would
justify denial of the permit), there may now be renewed interest
in the relevance of the public trust doctrine for dry sand areas
adjacent to both inland lakes and the ocean. See Matthews v. Bay
Head Improvement Association, 95 N.J. 306, 471 A.2d 355, cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984).
22. Marks v. Whitney, 6 Ca1.3d 251, 261, 491 P.2d 374, 381,
98 Cal. Rptr. 790, 797 (1971) (marina on Tomales Bay); Atwood v.
Hammond, 4 Ca1.2d 31, 37, 48 P.2d 20, 25 (1935) (public buildings
on reclaimed area in San Diego Bay).
23. See aenerally Dunning, supra note 11.
24. See People v. Gold Run Ditch & Mining Co., 66 Cal. 138,
151-2, 4 P. 1152, 1159 (1884); People v. Russ, 132 cal. 102, 64
P. 111 (1901).
25. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources
Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 473
39
(1970).
26. Other theories under consideration included the
contention that the city's use of water was in violation of the
reasonableness limitation in the California constitution, cal.
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"absolute priority to fish" and as such may violate the
reasonable beneficial use provision of the state constitution
(Art. X, Section 2). Id. at 15. The court, however, suggested
that in light of Audubon the code section might be read as non-
mandatory and the court might instead use the Audubon principles
"to balance the public trust values in Lower Rush Creek vs. the
needs of the people of the City of Los Angeles." Id.
Subsequently the court required the city to maintain a release of
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at least nineteen cubic feet per second from the dam. These
releases continue today, while an instream flow study of lower
Rush Creek is being carried out.
Subsequently similar developments occurred with regard to
lower Lee Vining Creek. As a result of a wet winter in 1986 the
three miles between the city dam and Mono Lake received large
amounts of spilled water for six weeks and with it three hundred
adult trout. Metropolitan Water District of Southern California,
Focus 3 (Number 2, 1988). These augmented a self-sustaining
trout fishery which had survived on intermittent spills and other
inflow. Id.; Mono Lake Committee v. City of Los Angeles, No.
8608, slip op. at 3 (Mono Cty. Sup. Ct. Oct. 21, 1987). In a
lawsuit based upon both the public trust doctrine and Fish and
Game Code Section 5937, the plaintiff won a preliminary
injunction which requires the city to release up to five cubic
feet per second of water from its dam in order to maintain a
minimum flow of three cfs at the beginning of a designated
downstream reach. Id. at 10. This outcome was said to be the
result of "weighing and balancing the proposed water uses, with
the concomitant right of perpetual review, as declared in
Audubon," id. at 7, pending a full trial on the merits.
Meanwhile an instream flow study of lower Lee Vining Creek is
underway.
Preservation of fish in Lee Vining Creek does not, of
course, directly or necessarily further any public trust use of
Mono Lake. But the court stated its belief that the creek with
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its fish and habitat "could reasonably be held to come under an
extended application of public trust consideration . . .
independent of any considerations of navigability of Lee Vining
creek." water development interests estimate the annual cost of
the replacement water and power at $1.2 million. Metropolitan
Water District of Southern California, supra this note.
In addition to these actions, the National Audubon Society
and the Mono Lake Committee filed a mandamus action in state
court to compel the State Water Resources Control Board to
incorporate in the Mono Basin licenses issued to the City of Los
Angeles language requiring downstream releases of water in
compliance with Fish and Game Code Section 5937. They were
unsuccessful in the trial court, National Audubon Society v.
State Water Resources Control Board, Nos. 336712 and 336715
(Sacramento Sup. Ct. July 30, 1986), and presently are pursuing
the matter on appeal.
54. Nearly eighteen months after the final decision of the
California Supreme Court and the remand of the matter to the
federal district court, that court decided that all claims except
that based on the federal common law of nuisance should be
severed and remanded to the state court system in order to avoid
an inappropriate exercise of federal pendent jurisdiction over
issues of state law. National Audubon Society v. Department of
Water and Power, No. Civil S-80-127 LKK, slip opinion at 34 (E.D.
Cal. Nov. 8, 1984). That decision is currently pending on appeal
in the Ninth Circuit (Nos. 85-2046, 85-2105, 85-2236, 85-2237 and
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85-2238).
55. On the CVP, see aenerally E. Cooper, Aaueduct E pire 
(1968).
56. At one time the federal plan was to extend that canal
some three hundred miles down the east side of the San Joaquin
Valley, in order to deliver water to various points as far south
as Kern County. Id. at 161-2.
57. The decision, D1400, is explicit that the substantial
instream flows approved are required only once Auburn Dam is
constructed.
58. Water Education Foundation, Western Water 5 (Nov./Dec.
1985).
59. Q. at 6. Historically Rancho Seco has used about one-
third of the contracted amount. The Sacramento Bee, March 7,
1988, at B2, col. 4. Approximately an additional 175,000 acre-
feet of American River water are sold annually by the U.S. Bureau
of Reclamation to others, mostly local cities and water agencies,
who hold contractual rights for up to 935,000 acre-feet of water.
Id. at Bl, col. 5.
60. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. East Bay Municipal
Utility District, 52 Cal. App. 3d 828, 125 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1975).
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Utility District, 20 Ca1.3d 327, 572 P.2d 1128, 142 Cal. Rptr.
904 (1977).
62. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. East Bay Municipal
Utility District, 439 U.S. 811 (1978) (judgment vacated and case
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65. The draft report of referee prepared by staff, id., is
now before the full board for consideration, and several days of
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66. Cooper, supra note 55, at 266.
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was critical of several agency determinations, but it left D1485
intact as hearings on a decision to replace it were about to
begin. United States v. State Water Resources Control Board, 182
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69. State Water Resources Control Board, Decision 1485 18
(1978).
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attributable largely to critical comments in the Racanelli
decision. D1485 aimed to maintain "without project" conditions
in the Delta, with "project" meaning only the CVP and the State
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water quality objectives on the unjustified premise that upstream
users retained unlimited access to upstream waters, while the
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leading example. See supra note 17.
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at 282.
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76. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
77. See, e.g., Morton V. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974).
78. United States v. State Water Resources Control Board,
51
182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 148-52, 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 200-02 (1986).
79. Id. at 150, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 201.
80. Erickson v. Queen Valley Ranch Company, 22 Cal. App. 3d
578, 99 cal. Rptr. 446 (1971).
81. United States v. State Water Resources Control Board,
182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 129, 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 187 (1986)
82. Cal. Water Code § 1394 (West 1971).
83. Audubon, 33 Ca1.3d at 427-28, 658 P.2d at 713-14, 189
Cal. Rptr. at 350-51, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
84. Cal. Pub. Res. Code §§ 21000 et seq. (West 1986).
85. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331 et seq. (1977).
86. See County of Inyo v. Yorty, 32 Cal. App. 3d 795, 806,
108 Cal. Rptr. 377, 385 (1973); cf. Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21169
(West 1977).
87. Sax, "The (Unhappy) Truth About NEPA," 26 Okla. L. Rev.
239 (1973); cf. Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v.
Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980).
88. NEPA, for example, declares that it is the continuing
policy of the federal government to use all practicable means "to
create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can
exist in productive harmony." National Environmental Policy Act
§ 101, 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1977); CEQA, inter alia, initially
declared that the state policy was to ensure that the long-term
protection of the environment shall be "the" guiding criterion in
public decisions. California Environmental Quality Act, Cal.
Pub. Res. Code § 21001 (West 1977). In 1979 this was qualified
52
by the addition of the following: "consistent with the provision
of a decent home and suitable living environment for every
Californian." California Environmental Quality Act, Cal. Pub.
Res. Code § 21001 (West 1986).
89. See supra note 17. The relationship between the Equal
Footing and public trust doctrines is considered in some detail
in the recent decision in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi,
No. 86-870 (U.S. S. Ct. Feb. 23, 1988) (states upon entering
Union acquire title to all land beneath water subject to tidal
influence, even if the water was not navigable-in-fact).
90. Cal. Water Code § 102 (West 1971); see generally Note,
"The Public Trust Doctrine as a Source of State Reserved Water
Rights," 63 Den. U. L. Rev. 585 (1986).
91. Audubon, 33 Ca1.3d at 441, 658 P.2d at 724, 189 Cal.
Rptr. at 361, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
92. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
93. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); United
States v. City and County of Denver, 656 P.2d 1 (S. Ct. Colo.
1982).
94. From Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908) to
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
95. Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923).
96. See Summa Corp. v. California ex rel. State Lands
Commission, 466 U.S. 198, 205 (1984). But gf. Phillips Petroleum
Co. V. Mississippi, No. 86-870 (U.S. S. Ct. Feb. 23, 1988).
97. See Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 107 S. Ct.
53
3141 (1987).
98. Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 753 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1985),
vacated and remanded, 106 S. Ct. 3269 (1986); 	  F. Supp.
	  (D. Haw. 1987) (No. Civ. 74-32) (LEXIS 10953) (appeal
pending) (change in state water rights law as an unconstitutional
taking); cf. O'Brien, "New Conditions for Old Water Rights: An
Examination of the Sources and Limits of State Authority" (to
appear - Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst.) ("Consistent with Nollan,
courts should closely scrutinize terms and conditions which
affect [the priority] of the appropriative right."); Lazarus,
"Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural
Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine," 71 Iowa L.
Rev. 631, 674-75 (1986) (the public trust doctrine "adds little
to the degree of governmental immunity from taking challenges to
governmental environmental protection and conservation
measures.")
99. Cal. Water Code § 1629 (West 1951) (license to
appropriate); , Cal. Water Code § 1392 (West 1951) (same language
regarding permit to appropriate). These provisions, of course,
deal with the water right but not the physical facilities which
may be useless if there is no water right. As to the latter, in
the comparable situation in federal power law, when the
government takes over project works upon the expiration of a
licensee, the licensee is only entitled to payment for its "net
investment." 16 U.S.C. § 807 (a) (1985). That term is defined
at 16 U.S.C. § 796 (1985).
54
100. See generally Dunbar, supra note 8.
101. People v. Gold Run Ditch & Mining Co., 656 Cal. 138, 4
P. 1152 (1884); Woodruff v. North Bloomfield Mining Co., 18 F.
753 (9th Cit. 1884).
102. IA. at 758-61. Mention was also made of injuries to
navigation. Id. at 761-62. See generally Ziebarth,
"California's First Environmental Battle," 4 Cal. Lawyer 56, 58
(No. 8, 1984).
103. Herminghaus v. Southern California Edison Co., 200
Cal. 81, 252 P.607 (1926), cert. dismissed, 275 U.S. 486 (1927).
104. This decision led directly to enactment of an anti-
waste, pro-water development amendment to the state constitution,
Cal. Const. Art. X, Section 2.
105. Of the Western states, California has been the most
protective of the riparian water right. Recently, in fact, the
California Supreme Court unanimously confirmed that federal
agencies can claim these rights on the same basis as private
landowners. In re Water of Hallett Creek Stream System, suvra
note 26.
106. City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Ca1.3d
199, 537 P.2d 1250, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1975).
107. People v. Shirokow, 26 Ca1.3d 301, 605 P.2d 859, 162
Cal. Rptr. 30 (1980).
108. Cal. Water Code § 1243 (1971) (enacted 1959).
109. Where no physical control is taken of the water, such
appropriation is prohibited in California. Fullerton v. State
55
Water Resources Control Board, 90 Cal. App. 3d 590, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 518 (1979); California Trout, Inc. v. State Water Resources
Control Board, 90 Cal. App. 3d 816, 153 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1979).
110. In D1485, this was done to protect such uses
identified in a water quality control plan. See supra note 68.
111. Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 5093.50 et seq. (West 1986);
Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1271 (1985).
112. Although such rights arising by implication of the
Organic Administration Act of June 4, 1897, 16 U.S.C. § 473 et
seq., have been narrowly construed, United States v. New Mexico,
438 U.S. 696 (1978) (to serve only principal purposes of a
national forest, which do not include aesthetics, recreation or
fish preservation), other statutes may have a broader meaning.
Sierra Club v. Block, 622 F. Supp. 842 (D. Colo. 1985), appeal 
pending (Wilderness Act basis for reserved right to instream
flows).
113. See 'generally Tarlock, "Appropriation for Instream
Flow Maintenance: A Progress Report on 'New' Public Western
Water Rights," 1978 Utah L. Rev. 211 (1978).
114. Although the term "water marketing" is often used to
describe the initial sales of water from a new water development
project, the current policy debate on the concept focuses on the
allocation of water rights through market mechanisms. See
aenerally Oeltjen & Fischer, "Allocation of Rights to Water:
Preferences, Priorities, and the Role of the Market," 57 Neb. L.
Rev. 245 (1978). Instream protection can be achieved, for
56
example, if senior diversion rights can be purchased and
dedicated to nondiversion. Ways to restructure water rights and
otherwise encourage private markets to "produce" instream flow
are discussed in T. Anderson, Water Crisis: Ending the Policy
Drought 73-85 (1983).
115. Proposals for such regulation can be found at
Governor's Commission to Review California Water Rights Law,
Final Report 113-14 and 120-28 (1978).
116. Recent litigation in California over the question
whether federal agencies hold riparian water rights under state
law was triggered by a Forest Service claim as a riparian to
water for "wildlife enhancement." In re Water of Hallett Creek
Stream System, No. S.F. 25133, slip op. at 3 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Feb.
18, 1988) (petition for limited reconsideration pending). A
proposal to deny federal agencies state law riparian rights but
permit them instream flow appropriations for public purposes is
presented in Comment, "California Water for National Forests:
Reserved Rights, Riparian Rights, and Instream Appropriations,"
20 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 921, 950-53 (1987).
117. See supra, note 99, regarding conditions precedent
which would affect the valuation of appropriative rights to water
held under permit or license in California.
118. Audubon, 33 Ca1.3d at 425, 658 P.2d at 712, 189 Cal.
Rptr. at 349.
119. This has frequently occurred in the tidelands and
submerged lands cases, City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26
57
Ca1.3d 515, 606 P.2d 362, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327, cert. denied, sub
nom. Santa Fe Land Improvement Co. v. City of Berkeley, 449 U.s.
840 (1980); Illinois Central R.R. V. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387
(1892), and in fact in waters rights cases generally there is far
more bending of doctrinal "rules" to achieve a result perceived
as fair than is commonly recognized. See generally Dunning,
"State Equitable Apportionment of Western Water Resources," 66
Neb. L. Rev. 76 (1987).
120. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Association, Inc., 95
N.J. 306, 471 A.2d 355 (1984).
121. A leading federal precedent treats the doctrine as one
of state law, Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S.
387, 436-37 (1892), and has been so construed in a later
decision. Appleby v. New York, 271 U.S. 364, 395 n.13 (1926).
On the other hand, the public trust doctrine is closely related
to the federal Equal Footing doctrine, supra notes 17 and 89.
Furthermore, whether the public trust doctrine is founded on
sovereignty or prior ownership, the federal government generally
has both and consequently could in theory develop a federal law
public trust doctrine. In some sense this has been done for
federal public lands, supra note 71, and it could in the future
be done with regard to navigable water. Perhaps the well-
recognized existence of a Commerce Clause-based federal
navigational servitude has inhibited such a development.
122. The priority of a reserved water right is the date
upon which the associated federal land was reserved for
58
particular federal purposes. Cappaert V. United States, 426 U.S.
128 (1976). Generally such dates are rather early, so if the
scope of a reserved right is sufficient to encompass an instream
use, exercise of that right may preclude dewatering of a stream
by the exercise of junior rights to divert.
123. See supra, note 112.
124. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
125. Kootenai Environmental Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle
Yacht Club, Inc., 105 Idaho 622, 671 P.2d 1085 (1983). The court
followed Illinois Central in attributing implied constitutional
status to the public trust doctrine. It said that doctrine Nat
all times forms the outer boundaries of permissible government
action with respect to public trust resources." Id. at 632, 671
P.2d at 1095. It also included property values among the trust
interests protected by the doctrine.
126. Shokal v. Dunn, 109 Idaho 330, 336 n.2, 707 P.2d 441,
447 n.2 (1985).
127. Both Shokal and Kootenai are clear that any grant to
use state waters is subject to the public trust. Id; Kootenai
Environmental Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 105
Idaho 622, 631, 671 P.2d 1085, 1094 (1983). Interestingly,
whereas Kootenai repeatedly describes the trust as applicable to
"navigable" water, id. passim, Shokal says the state holds "all"
waters in trust. Shokal v. Dunn, 109 Idaho 330, 336 n.2, 707
P.2d 441, 447 n.2 (1985).
128. Montana Coalition for Stream Access v. Hildreth, 684
59
P.2d 1088 (1984); Montana Coalition for Stream Access v. Curran,
682 P.2d 163 (1984); cf. Gibson v. Kelly, 15 Mont. 417, 423, 39
P. 517, 519 (1895).
129. Galt V. State, 731 P.2d 912 (1987).
130. Montana Coalition for Stream Access v. Curran, 682
P.2d at 170.
131. Comment, "An Analysis of the Potential Conflict
Between the Prior Appropriation and Public Trust Doctrines in
Montana Water Law," 8 Pub. Land L. Rev. 81, 112 (1987) ("Under
Montana's current expression of the public trust doctrine no
ground exists for the court to effect a reallocation of a vested
water right in favor of a broad recreational use without
requiring just compensation.")
132. See aenerallv 12 Environs No. 1 (January 1988)
(published by the Environmental Law Society of the UC Davis
School of Law).
133. Currently the Environmental Defense Fund is preparing
a study on the water and power alternatives for Los Angeles
should the city's water diversions from the Mono Basin be
reduced. This follows on the heels of the National Academy of
Science report supporting the contention of the Mono Basin
Research Group that those diversions are causing serious
environmental damage. See supra note 5. Also in preparation by
the Forest Service is a study on the appropriate water level in
Mono Lake from a land management point of view. The service has









0	 5	 10	 20
SUN in Miles
OLSOM RES
NATOMA
Folsom
South
Canal
SACRAMENTO
Sacramento
River
25 Miles Completed.
15 Miles to
MokelumneA .ueduets.
CAMANC E
Pardee
Res
STOCKTON
OP°
APPENDIX A
ea%
n-..-.
N--
r
APPENDIX B
